



Col. Stig Wennerstrom

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# A Crack In NATO Defense

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PARIS.

NATO defense plans for northern Norway have been seriously undermined by information which Swedish spy Col. Stig Wennerstrom passed to the Soviet Union, according to reports reaching here.

The Russians reportedly assigned Wennerstrom the task of finding out mobilization and defense plans for the north of Sweden. With ~~SECRET~~ in hand, the Soviet Army could launch a "backdoor" invasion of northern Norway, across Finland and Swedish Lapland.

Such an attack—presumably non-nuclear in order to place the burden of nuclear war on the NATO powers—could cut Norway in half, and give the Soviets control of the entire northern Norwegian coast.

#### Bases for Subs

Then the Soviet Arctic Fleet could move into the Atlantic, with submarines and aircraft based along the Norwegian coast, as they were for Germany in World War II.

Wennerstrom is said to have given the Russians full details of location and contents of military supply depots in Lapland. The Swedish mobilization timetable, the location of roadblocks and defense works, the type of artillery the Swedes would employ, radar installations for air defense, and the speed at which reinforcements could be moved from the

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populous south of Sweden up to the sparsely settled north.

#### Spy for 18 Years

Wennerstrom, a former Swedish air attaché in Washington, has admitted spying for the Russians for 18 years. A secret judicial inquiry in Stockholm is studying ramifications of the case, which has rocked the Swedish government and troubled Swedish-Soviet relations.

The case is forcing a complete revision of Swedish war plans at a cost estimated at about \$200 million. In fact, so widespread and detailed were Wennerstrom's activities that the damaging disclosures concerning the defense plans for Lapland were only a secondary part of his work. An indirect penetration of NATO and U. S. defense secrets appears to have been his primary mission.

#### The Strategy

NATO's Northern Command has based its Norwegian planning on the assumption that any Soviet attempt to advance overland across the north would encounter substantial Swedish resistance, providing time for Norway to mobilize and for NATO reinforcements to be sent from other areas.

Virtually all of the active Norwegian Army is brigaded plus supporting artillery and special troops—but concentrated in the Trondheim area around the airbase at Bardufoss. To the south is the key port of Narvik and to the north lies the city of Tromso. This is the communications hub of north Norway, and must be held if Norway is not to be split in half.

On the assumption that Sweden would be unable to offer a strong and effective "backdoor" defense, Norwegian and NATO strategists have concentrated on the threat of invasion from the sea in the north.

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#### Complicated Task

But now, the task will be vastly more complicated.

If there is any direct contact between the Norwegian and Swedish defense staffs, it is of an extremely secret nature. Both governments would deny it absolutely, and quite possibly it does not exist. Yet the military and strategic involvement of the two countries is a geographic and political fact of life.

For example, Swedish iron ore, mined in Lapland, moves on a Swedish-owned railroad line across Norway to the port of Narvik for shipment by boat to Goteburg. And at the Norwegian port of Trondheim in the north, the Swedes have huge tank storage facilities, and have surveyed a pipeline route from Norway into Sweden.